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Abstract
This paper studies the security of an image encryption scheme based on the Hill
cipher and reports its following problems: 1) there is a simple necessary and sufficient
condition that makes a number of secret keys invalid; 2) it is insensitive to the change
of the secret key; 3) it is insensitive to the change of the plain-image; 4) it can be
broken with only one known/chosen-plaintext; 5) it has some other minor defects.
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1 Introduction1
The history of cryptography can be traced back to the secret communication2
among people thousands of years ago. With the development of human society3
and industrial technology, theories and methods of cryptography have been4
changed and improved gradually, and meanwhile cryptanalysis has also been5
developed. In 1949, Shannon published his seminar paper “Communication6
theory of secrecy systems” [1], which marked the beginning of the modern7
cryptology.8
In the past two decades, the security of multimedia data has become more9
and more important. However, it has been recognized that the traditional10
text-encryption schemes cannot efficiently protect multimedia data due to11
some special properties of the multimedia data, such as strong redundancy12
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and bulk size of the uncompressed data. To meet this challenge, a number13
of special image encryption schemes based on some nonlinear theories were14
proposed [2–4]. Yet, many of them are found to be insecure from the view15
point of cryptography [5–17].16
In [18], Ismail et al. tried to encrypt images efficiently by modifying the clas-17
sical Hill cipher [19]. This paper studies the security of the scheme proposed18
in [18] and reports the following findings: 1) there exist a number of invalid19
secret keys; 2) the scheme is insensitive to the change of the secret key; 3)20
the scheme is insensitive to the change of the plain-image; 4) the scheme can21
be broken with only one known/chosen plain-image; 5) the scheme has some22
other minor performance defects.23
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly in-24
troduces the encryption scheme to be studied. Section 3 presents detailed25
cryptanalysis of the scheme. The last section concludes the paper.26
2 The image encryption scheme to be studied27
The scheme proposed in [18] scans the gray scales of a plain-image P (or
one channel of a color image) of size M × N in a raster order and divides it
into ⌈MN/m⌉ vectors of size m: {Pl}
⌈MN/m⌉
l=1 , where Pl = {P ((l − 1) · m +
1), · · · ,P ((l− 1) ·m+m)} (the last vector is padded with some zero bytes if
MN can not be divided by m). Then, the vectors {Pl}
⌈MN/m⌉
l=1 are encrypted
in increasing order with the following function:
Cl = (Pl ·Kl) mod 256, (1)
where K1 = (K1[i, j])m×m, K1[i, j] ∈ Z256, the initial state of Kl≥2 is set to
be Kl−1, and then every row of Kl is generated iteratively with the following
function, for i = 1 ∼ m:
Kl[i, :] = (IV ·Kl) mod 256, (2)
where IV is a vector of size 1×m and IV [i] ∈ Z256. Finally, the cipher-image28
is obtained as C = {Cl}
⌈MN/m⌉
l=1 .29
The secret key of the encryption scheme includes three parts: m, K0, and IV .30
The decryption procedure is the same as the above encryption procedure ex-
cept that Eq. (1) is replaced by the following function:
Pl = (Cl ·K
−1
l ) mod 256, (3)
2
where (Kl ·K
−1
l ) mod 256 = I, the identity matrix.31
3 Cryptanalysis32
3.1 Some Defects of the Scheme33
3.1.1 Invalid keys34
An invalid key is a key that fails to ensure the success of the encryption scheme.35
From the following Fact 1 and Corollary 1, one can see that one secret key36
in the above-described scheme is invalid if and only if gcd(K1, 256) 6= 1 or37
IV [i] mod 2 = 0.38
Fact 1 A matrix K is invertible in Zn if and only if gcd(det(K), n) = 1.39
Proposition 1 det(Kl) =
(
m∏
i=1
IV [i]
)
det(Kl−1).40
Proof : According to Eq. (2), there is a relation between Kl and Kl−1, as
follows:
Kl =


m∑
i=1
IV [i]Kl−1[i, :]
IV [1]Kl[1, :] +
m∑
i=2
IV [i]Kl−1[i, :]
...
m−1∑
i=1
IV [i]Kl[i, :] + IV [m]Kl−1[m, :]


mod 256. (4)
Subtracting
i0−1∑
i=1
IV [i]Kl[i, :] from Kl[i0, :] for i0 = m ∼ 2, one gets41
K
′
l =


m∑
i=1
IV [i]Kl−1[i, :]
m∑
i=2
IV [i]Kl−1[i, :]
...
IV [m]Kl−1[m, :]


mod 256. (5)
Subtracting K ′l [i0, :] from K
′
l [i0 − 1, :] for i0 = 2 ∼ m, one has42
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K
′′
l =


IV [1]Kl−1[1, :]
IV [2]Kl−1[2, :]
...
IV [m]Kl−1[m, :]


mod 256. (6)
Obviously, det(Kl) = det(K
′
l) = det(K
′′
l ) =
(
m∏
i=1
IV [i]
)
det(Kl−1), which43
completes the proof of the proposition. 44
Corollary 1 det(Kl) =
(
m∏
i=1
IV [i]
)l−1
det(K1).45
Proof : The result directly follows from Proposition 1. 46
3.1.2 Insensitivity to the change of the secret key47
Although it is claimed in [18, Sec. 5] that the encryption scheme is very sen-48
sitive to the change of the sub-keys K1, IV , this is not true.49
Let’s first study the influence onKl≥2 if only one bit ofK1 is changed. Without50
loss of generality, assume that the n-th significant bit of K1(1, j0) is changed51
from zero to one, where 0 ≤ n ≤ 7. Let K˜l denote the modified version of Kl.52
The change Dl = K˜l −Kl can be presented by the following two equations:53
Dl[:, j] ≡ 0, for j 6= j0, (7)
Dl[:, j0] =


m∑
i=1
IV [i]Dl−1[i, j0]
IV [1]Dl[1, j0] +
m∑
i=2
IV [i]Dl−1[i, j0]
...
m−1∑
i=1
IV [i]Dl[i, j0] + IV [m]Dl−1[m, j0]


mod 256, (8)
where D1[1, j0] = 2
n, D1[i, j0] = 0, i = 2 ∼ m.54
Since IV [i] mod 2 6= 0, Dl[i, j0] 6= 0 always exist. From Eq. (8), one can see
that Dl[i, j0] ≥ 2
n exists, which means that only the n0-th bit of Cl[j0] may
possibly be changed, where n0 ≥ n. Note also that there is no influence on Cl
if
(PlDl[:, j0]) mod 256 = 0.
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To verify the above analysis, an experiment has been carried out using a plain-
image “Lenna” with the secret key
m = 4, IV = (3 9 17 33),K1 =


11 2 3 7
8 5 19 103
201 203 119 150
7 9 21 35


. (9)
Only the 5-th significant bit ofK1[1, 2] is changed, namely K˜1[1, 2] = (K1[1, 2]+55
25) mod 256. Let C˜ denote the cipher-image corresponding to K˜1. The bit-56
planes of difference |C˜−C| are shown in Fig. 1, which demonstrates the very57
weak sensitivity of the encryption scheme with respect to K1.58
a) 0 ∼ 4-th b) 5-th c) 6-th d) 7-th
Fig. 1. The bit-planes of |C˜ −C| when one bit of K1 is changed.
Now, consider the influence on Kl≥2 if only one bit of IV is changed. Without59
loss of generality, assume the n-th significant bit of IV [1] is changed from60
zero to one. Similarly, let Dl denote the change of Kl. Due to the extremely61
complex formulation of Dl≥3, only D2 is shown here.62
D2[:, j] =


K1[1, j]2
n
D2[1, j](IV [1] + 2
n) +K2[1, j]2
n
D2[2, j] + IV [2]D2[2, j]
...
D2[2, j] +
m−1∑
i=2
IV [i]D2[i, j]


mod 256, (10)
where j = 1 ∼ m.63
To see the influence of the change of IV , an experiment has been carried out64
using plain-image “Lenna”, with the same secret key shown in Eq. (9) above.65
Only the 5-th significant bit of IV [1] is changed, namely I˜V [1] = (IV [1] +66
25) mod 256. The bit-planes of difference between cipher-images corresponding67
to IV and I˜V , respectively, are shown in Fig. 2.68
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Comparing Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, one can see that the sensitivty with respect69
to IV is much stronger than the one with respect to K1, which agrees with70
the above theoretical analysis. But one bit change of a sub-key of a secure71
cipher should cause every bit of the ciphertext changed with a probability of72
1
2
. Obviously, the sensitivity of the encryption scheme with respect to sub-keys73
K1, IV is very far from this requirement.74
a) 0 ∼ 4-th b) 5-th c) 6-th d) 7-th
Fig. 2. The bit-planes of |C˜ −C| when one bit of IV is changed.
3.1.3 Insensitivity to the change of the plain-image75
This property is especially important for image encryption since an image and76
its watermarked version may be encrypted simultaneously.77
Since the role of Pl in Eq. (1) is exactly the same as that of IV in Eq. (2),78
the analysis about its insensitivity to the change of the plain-image can be79
carried out just like the case about the sub-key IV discussed above.80
3.1.4 Some other problems81
The encryption scheme has the following additional problems:82
(1) cannot encrypt plain-image of a fixed value zero;83
(2) efficiency of implementation is low : From [20, Thorem 2.3.3], one can see
that the number of invertible matrices of size m×m in Z256 is
|GL(m,Z256)| = 2
7m2
m−1∏
k=0
(2m − 2k). (11)
Thus, the probability that a matrix of size m×m in Z256 is invertible is
pm =
27m
2 ∏m−1
k=0 (2
m − 2k)
28m2
=
m∏
k=1
(1− 2−k) ≈
1
3
. (12)
So, it needs O(3m2) and O(m2 ·MN) times of computations, respectively,84
for checking the reversibility of K1 and for calculating {K
−1
l }
⌈MN/m⌉
l=1 .85
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Note that these computations have no direct contributions to protecting86
the plain-image.87
(3) the scope of sub-key m is limited : As discussed above, the larger the value88
m the higher the computational cost.89
(4) the confusion capability is weak : This problem is caused by the linearity of90
the main encryption function. To demonstrate this defect, the encryption91
result of one special plain-image is shown in Fig. 3, where Figure 3b) also92
effectively disproves the conclusion about the quality of encryption results93
given in [18, Sec. 4].94
a) plain-image b) cipher-image
Fig. 3. A special test image, “Test pattern”.
3.2 Known/Chosen-Plaintext Attack95
The known/chosen-plaintext attack works by reconstructing the secret key or96
its equivalent based on some known/chosen plaintexts and their corresponding97
ciphertexts.98
For this encryption scheme, the equivalent key {Kl}
⌈MN/m⌉
l=1 can be recon-
structed from m plain-images P (1) ∼ P (m) and their corresponding cipher-
images C(1) ∼ C(m) by using
Kl =


P
(B)
l ·


C
(1)
l
C
(2)
l
...
C
(m)
l




mod 256, (13)
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where
P
(B)
l =


P
(1)
l
P
(2)
l
...
P
(m)
l


−1
. (14)
The reversibility of P
(B)
l can be ensured by utilizing more thanm plain-images99
or by choosing m special plain-images. Note that the above known/chosen-100
plaintext attack can be carried out with only one know/chosen plain-image101
due to the very short period of sequence {Kl[:, j]}
⌈MN/m⌉
l=1 for j = 1 ∼ m. To102
study the period of this sequence, 10,000 tests have been done for a given103
value of IV of size 1 × 3, where K1 is selected randomly. The numbers of104
tests where the corresponding sequence {Kl(:, 1)}
⌈MN/m⌉
l=1 has period p, Np,105
with some values of IV , is shown in Table 1, which shows that the period of106
{Kl[:, j]}
⌈MN/m⌉
l=1 is indeed very short.107
Table 1
Values of Np with some values of IV , p = 2
s, s = 3 ∼ 9.
IV N8 N16 N32 N64 N128 N256 N512
(91, 63, 45) 0 0 0 0 0 1463 8537
(113, 25, 219) 14 34 127 561 3561 5703 0
(253, 115, 17) 6 20 72 284 1081 8537 0
(1, 3, 5) 0 0 98 284 1081 8537 0
(5, 121, 247) 7 36 132 561 3561 5703 0
4 Conclusion108
In this paper, the security and performance of an image encryption scheme109
based on the Hill cipher have been analyzed in detail. It has been found that110
the scheme can be broken with only one known/chosen plain-image. There111
is a simple necessary and sufficient condition that makes a number of secret112
keys invalid. In addition, the scheme is insensitive to the change of the se-113
cret key/plain-image. Some other performance defects have also been found.114
In conclusion, the encryption scheme under study actually has much weaker115
security than the original Hill cipher, therefore is not recommended for appli-116
cations.117
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